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LIMITED DISCOVERY AND THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE
PROCEDURES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
JUSTICE WlLukM

H.

ERICKSON*

INTRODUCTION

The spiraling cost of litigation makes the adversarial system an impractical and expensive means for the timely resolution of legal disputes.1
Horror stories abound about the cost of discovery, legal fees, and delays
incident to the trial and appeal of a contested case. 2 Discovery abuse is
often singled out as the leading contributor to the escalating cost of litigation. Former Vice President Dan Quayle, as Chair of the President's
Council on Competitiveness, asserted that discovery was one of the main
culprits destroying America's competitive edge and furthering the decline
3
of our nation's legal culture.
As a result of past failures for reform, 4 amendments to both the federal and state rules of civil procedure have been proposed. On December
1, 1993, the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. 5 The most controversial change involves the
amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many
commentators believe these amendments will lead to an increase in discovery abuse, thereby further increasing the cost of litigation. In contrast,
* William H. Erickson, Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court (Chief Justice 19831985); Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Former President, International Society of
Barristers; Former Chairman, Fellows of the American Bar Foundation; International Academy of Trial awyers; Member of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force; and Member
of the American Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay.
1. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L.

REv. S5, S6 (1989).
2. See Jane Birnbaum & Morton D. Sosland, Guilty! Too Many Lawyers and Too Much
Litigation. Here's a Better Way, Bus. W&, Apr. 13, 1992, at 60, 61 (noting that law firms grossed
more than $100 billion in collected legal fees in 1991, with one major company alone spending over $100 million a year in legal services and liability insurance); see alsoJulie Johnson &
Ratu Kamlani, Do We Have Too Many Lawyers?, TIME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 54 (generally supporting the August 13, 1991, remarks by former Vice President, Dan Quayle at the American Bar
Association meeting in Atlanta, Ga.).
3. See generally former Vice President Dan Quayle, Prepared Remarks by the Vice Presi-

dent to the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") in Atlanta, Ga. (Aug.
13, 1991) (transcript on file with the A.B.A.) [hereinafter Quayle Remarks]; THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JusTcIE REFORM IN AMERICA 3, 4 (1991)
[hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM] (noting that discovery accounts for over 80% of the cost
of a typical lawsuit and is often used as a weapon with staggering costs to the responding
party); ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, A.B.A, ATTACKING LITIGA.
TION COSTS AND DELAY 7 (1984) [hereinafter ACTION COMMISSION] (noting excessive delays
prior to trial are often the result of expensive discovery which is "excessive in relation to the
magnitude of the case"); WORKING GROUP ON CVLJUSTICE SYSTEM PROPOSALS, A.B.A., A.B.A
BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM xiii to xv (1992) [hereinafter ABA

BLUEPRINT] (responding to former Vice President Quayle's demand for reform).
4. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
5. See infra pL II.
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however, the amendments to Rule 26 may also work a beneficial effect by
increasing the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution (ADR).
Part'I of this Article provides a general description of past efforts to
reform the legal system in both federal and state courts. Part II briefly
discusses the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery techniques, followed by a discussion focusing specifically on
the amendments to Rule 26. Part III first discusses the potential adverse
effects of Rule 26, then concludes by illustrating how the amendments to
Rule 26 will, instead, likely increase the beneficial use of ADR.
I.

BACKGROUND

Dean Roscoe Pound, in 1906, delivered his classic address, "The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice," at
the American Bar Association meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota. He highlighted the archaic nature of court proceedings, the uncertainty and expense of trial, and the "injustice" of basing decisions on procedural
6
technicalities rather than the merits of the case.
Since Dean Pound sounded his clarion call for change, major improvements to the adversarial system of litigation have been made. 7 In
1976, Chief Justice Warren Burger convened the Pound Conference 8 in
St. Paul, Minnesota, to again consider Pound's complaints and to prepare
a blueprint for future improvements in the administration of justice. 9
Many of the leading lawyers, judges, and professors attended the conference to consider abuse of discovery, simplified pleadings, alternative
means for dispute resolution, and a number of other complaints. Following the conference, Griffin Bell was appointed to chair a committee to
study means to implement the recommendations. 10 Unfortunately, however, procedures for securing timely, reasonably priced resolution of civil
disputes have not been developed and implemented.1 1
Efforts have been made to develop procedures that would limit discovery, simplify and abbreviate pleadings, and shorten the time and meth6. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, Address Before the A.B.A. Convention in St. Paul, Minn. (Aug. 26, 1906), reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273 (1964).
7. See, e.g., William H. Erickson, Responses of the American Bar Association, 64 A.B.A. J. 48
(1978) (response of the organized bar to the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, also known as the "Pound Conference;" holding the view that significant efforts towards Pound's goals had been accomplished
in the preceding 70 years).
8. See supra note 6. The Chief Justice's key-note address and many other addresses
from the Pound Conference are reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
9. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice
System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978).
10. A.B.A., Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.RID. 159 (1976); see also
Griffin B. Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of
Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320 (1978).
11. See generally AcTboN COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 7-44. Similarly, the A.B.A. responded to Vice President Quayle's concerns with a blueprint for improving the civil justice
system. See ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 3; Quayle Remarks, supra note 3. Like the other
attempts, however, the A.B.A. BLUEPRINT did not come to fruition.
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ods for resolving contested issues in a trial. 12 The A.B.A. Action
Commission 1 3 to Reduce Court Costs and Delay (Action Commission)
proposed a number of procedures to improve and reduce the cost of
resolving civil disputes. Several states have implemented many of the Action Commission's recommendations. Despite the success of a number of
the Action Commission's recommendations, however, many of the suggested procedures for reducing delay and making litigation more economical remain dormant at the federal level.
An experiment conducted in Ohio to reduce delay and expense for
example, centered on the use of videotaped presentations of the testimony of all witnesses. The procedure called for a trial judge to rule on
objections and edit the videotape in the presence of counsel. Once edited, the videotape would then be presented to the jury without interruption, resulting in a significant reduction in the time required to try the
case. Doctors were particularly pleased by the elimination of court appearances and the ability to testify as expert witnesses with a minimum loss of
14
time from their practice.
Another recommendation of the Action Commission that has been
successfully implemented is telephone conferencing. Telephone conferencing eliminates the need for attorneys to appear in court for settings, to
resolve motions, and to dispose of other routine matters. 15 Colorado,
Florida, New Jersey, and California have successfully implemented telephone conferencing procedures.
Colorado, as an alternative to the wide-open discovery procedures initially established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,16 and
Colorado's counterpart,' 7 imposed restrictions under Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure (C.R.C.P.) 26.1 in an attempt to limit and simplify discovery.18 C.R.C.P. 26.1 restricts the number of depositions that may be taken,
limits written interrogatories, and imposes a continuing duty to disclose
information necessary to keep the information provided in the discovery
process current. C.R.C.P. 26.1 also places restrictions on requests for admissions and on the time to complete discovery. C.R.C.P. 26.1 originally
provided that the procedures would be followed only if approved by all
parties to the litigation, and as a result, was rarely used. The Colorado
discovery rule has been more widely used since the enactment of an
12. For a discussion of various ADR procedures and the federal courts, see Kim Dayton,
The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REv. 889 (1991).
Several efforts to establish ADR procedures in state courts are highlighted in IN SEARCH OF
PROPER BALANCE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CIVIL JUSTICE IsSUES 21 (Insurance Information

Institute & Fordham University School of Law eds., 1986). See generally THE INSTITUTE FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, 1992-93 ANNUAL REPORT (1993).

13. See supra note 3.
14. See Irving Kosky, VideotapeIn Ohio, 59JUDIcATuRE 231,235-36 (1975); ThomasJ. Murray, Jr., Videotaped Depositions: The Ohio Experience, 61JUmCATUE 258, 261 (1978); Laurence B.
Stone, Use of Videotape in the Legal Profession, 45 OHIo B. 1213, 1216 (1972).
15. See ACTION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 45.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 to 37 [hereinafter F.IRC.P.]
17. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26 to 37 [hereinafter C.R.C.P.I.
18. The full text of C.RC.P. 26.1 appears infra in Appendix A.
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amendment to C.R.C.P. 26.1, which permits a court, in its discretion, to
impose the statutory discovery limitations in Rule 26.1.19
II.

THE AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RuLE

2620

The recently enacted amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as similar proposals presently under consideration in various
states, will materially alter discovery practice. 2' Unfortunately, the new
amendments to federal and state discovery rules may increase, rather than
reduce, discovery abuse and the cost of litigation. 2 2 The most controversial modification to the federal discovery procedure are the amendments
to Rule 2623 (which is substantially similar to Colorado's proposed Rule
2624).

The format of the amendments to Rule 26 requires parties to meet
and provide a discovery schedule that would require full disclosure. The
amendments adds a new component to civil litigation-automatic disclosure. The amendments also impose a continuing duty on both parties to
supplement disclosures when new information relating to the previous disclosures becomes available. Additionally, the amendments include the
right to obtain sanctions and protective orders.
The amendments, however, lack definitive standards for what is and
what is not subject to the rule of automatic disclosure. 25 The text employs
non-specific language such as: "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity."2 6 Opponents fear the changes will
increase the number of motions for protective orders and sanctions, and,
19. C.R.C.P. 26.1 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
20. Under the Enabling Act, the rulemaking power for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure resides in the Supreme Court. The drafting chores are assigned under the
Enabling Act to the Judicial Conference, which recommends the proposed rules to the
Supreme Court. The rules, if approved, are then sent to Congress, by May 1 of a given year
and become effective on December 1 of the same year, unless modified by Congress.
Justice White, in approving the proposed amendments, suggested that the rule-making
power exercised pursuant to the Enabling Act be placed exclusively in the Judicial
Conference and said:
If the rule-making for Federal District Courts is to continue under the present plan,
we believe that the Supreme Court should not have any part in the task; rather, the
statute should be amended to substitute the Judicial Conference. The Judicial
Conference can participate more actively in fashioning the rules and affirmatively
contribute to their content and design better than we can. Transfer of the function
to the Judicial Conference would relieve us of the embarrassment of having to sit in
judgement on the constitutionality of rules which we have approved and which as
applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid.
61 U.S.L.W. 4391 (Apr. 27, 1993).
21. See generally Symposium, MandatingDisclosure and LimitingDiscovery: The 1992 Amendments to Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable FederalProposals, 25 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 1
(1993).
22. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosurein Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L.
REv. 1, 41-46 (1992);John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1994, at 85.
23. Proposed F.R.C.P. 26 appears infra in Appendix B.
24. Proposed C.R.C.P 26 appears in 22 COLO. LAw. 2165, 2173-76 (1993).
25. See Bell et al., supra note 22, at 41.
26. See infra Appendix B, Rules 26(a)(1)(A)-(B); 61 U.S.L.W. 4372 (Apr. 27, 1993) (Proposed F.R.C.P. Rules 26(a) (1) (A)-(B)).
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in turn, increase cost to litigants. 27 Prior to the amendments to Rule 26,
the phrase, "relevant to the subject matter," had been broadly interpreted
to permit discovery if an inquiry may lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Broad interpretation of this phrase, in fact, has precipitated
many of the complaints relating to the abuse and excessive cost of
28
discovery.
A.

Criticism of the Amendments to Rule 26

The automatic disclosure requirements of the amendments to Rule
26 have prompted a firestorm of criticism. 29 The Reporter for the Advisory Committee acknowledged the then proposed amendments to Rule 26
brought protest from both the plaintiff and defense bars.30 Many lawyers
believe the new automatic disclosure requirements will trigger a flood of
motions for sanctions and protective orders that will inundate the trial
courts.
Some Justices of the Supreme Court also criticized the changes. Previously, with the exception of Justices Black and Douglas,3 ' Supreme
Court dissents to proposed rule changes have been rare. 3 2 Unusually,
however, due to the sweeping changes suggested by the Judicial Conference, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter registered strong dissents to the
approval of the proposed changes to the Rules.33 The dissents criticized
the extent of the changes proposed 34 and seriously questioned whether
current federal court rule-making procedure is working as well as in the
past. Specifically, Justice Scalia concluded that automatic disclosure would
not replace current discovery methods, but instead would add a new layer
27. Bell et al., supra note 22, at 41-46.
28. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-AgendaFor Reform, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1883, 1891 (1989); Geoffrey C. HazardJr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2244 (1989) (discussing two primary criticisms of the Federal Rules: (1) overly broad and intrusive scope; and (2) indiscriminate "trans-substantive" scope). For a discussion of state civil procedure discovery abuse as
viewed by attorneys in five different geographic areas, see Susan Keilitz et al., Attorneys' Views
of Civil Discovery, JUDGES' J. SPRING 1993, at 2.
29. See, e.g., Federal Rule 26 Amendments: Wrong Medicine for Discovery Problems, 58 DEF.
COUNSELJ. 454, 454-55 (1991) (The proposed discovery system will "disrupt... the existing
balance among counsel ....

lead to overdisclosure ....

new disputes regarding disclosure ....

[and] the prediscovery disclosure requirement would tend to undermine the adversary system."); see also Richard B. Schmitt, Lawyers Unite Against Plan to Speed Suits, WALL ST.J.,June 8,
1993, at BI (The proposed changes to the Federal Rules "have become a rallying point for
the normally fragmented bar."). But cf.Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58
BRooi. L. REv. 263, 265-67 (1992) (discussing proposed Rule 26 controversies but supporting reform).
30. Bell et al., supra note 22, at 28-29 n.107 (citing the Reporter's Summary May 20,
1992).
31. Justices Black and Douglas believed the Supreme Court should not be a mere conduit for submitting the rules to Congress, but should pass upon the merits of the proposed
rules. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4390, 4391 (Apr. 27, 1993).
32. Amendments to the F.R.C.P., 61 U.S.L.W. 4390, 4391 (Apr. 27, 1993).
33. Id. at 4392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Richard B. Schmitt, High Court Alters Way of DisclosingPretrialData, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 1993, at B2.
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only further frustrate
of discovery. 3 5 Such a system, he asserted, would
36
attempts at reducing litigation costs and delay.
Justice Scalia argued that frustration will emanate from two distinct
effects of the proposed Rule 26.37 Primarily, he viewed the broad language directing exchange of "relevant" facts as an invitation to further
litigation concerning just what is "relevant," and whether the opposing
side has adequately disclosed the required information. In his view, this
unnecessary variable will prompt additional and costly litigation with no
benefit to the litigants. 38 In addition, Justice Scalia's concern extended to
how, during the course of litigation, the determination of whether the
opposing side has fulfilled its 9continuing obligation to supplement the ini3
tial disclosure will be made.
Justice Scalia also suggested that the requirement to provide damaging information to the opposing side "does not fit comfortably within the
American judicial system." 40 Justice Scalia pointed out that the adversarial
nature of resolving contested issues in a trial does not square with a rule
mandating that an attorney use his professional skill to assist an adversary's
case preparation. 4 1 He emphasized that the proposed Rules drew almost
universal criticism from the legal profession. 42 Despite the concerns of
concurred in transmission
the dissenting Justices, a majority of the Court
43
of the proposed amendments to Congress.
On November 3, 1993, the United States House of Representatives
passed the Civil Rules Amendments Act of 1993, which, among other provisions, deleted the mandatory disclosure provisions in the amendments to
Rule 26. 4 1 The House's rationale for deleting the proposed changes to
Rule 26, was similar to that expressed byJustice Scalia and legal practitioners-i.e., that mandatory disclosure is an "anathema to the adversarial process," "will compromise the attorney client-privilege," and the standard,
"pleaded with particularity," is too vague and will increase, rather than
decrease, discovery burdens. 45 Additionally, Congress felt that, prior to
making such a substantive change in the Rules, it should wait until the
period of local experimentation mandated under the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 199046 was complete. 47 After voting to suspend the rules and pass
35. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4393 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Specifically, Justice Scalia criticized the expected increase in the volume of discovery and the inevitable increase in the production of irrelevant documents.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4390-4392.
44. H.R. 2814, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
45. 139 CONG. Rac. H8745-46 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act requires each United States District
Court to develop a plan to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits,
monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolutions of civil disputes." 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-72. Further, the Reform Act requires the Judicial Conference of the United States to prepare a comprehensive report on all plans enacted
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the bill, the House sent the bill to the Senate. The Senate, however, adjourned for the holiday without acting on the bill and on December 1,
1993, the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became
48
effective.
III.

PoTENTItAL

EFFECr

OF THE AMENDMENT TO

RuLE 26

Beyond the scope of continuous automatic disclosure is a much more
philosophical debate. Our legal system is based on an adversarial model.
An attorney is charged with the duty to vigorously pursue every available
lawful avenue for his or her client. 49 Automatic disclosure threatens the
legitimacy of the attorney-client relationship. Under the amendment,
each side must disclose information that supports, contradicts, or reduces
its claims. 50 The duty to disclose information detrimental to his client's
case cannot be easily reconciled with an attorney's duty of loyalty. 5 1 A
more practical result would require the litigants to disclose all evidence
52
that will be entered to support a claim or defense.
This concern, however, may miss the point and illustrate the problem
the amendments to Rule 26 seek to address. As my counterpart, Justice
Zlaket of the Arizona Supreme Court, succinctly stated in responding to
similar arguments:
[N]owhere in American Jurisprudence does the role of the advocate encompass delay, obstruction, obfuscation, evasion, destruction, or other such conduct under the guise of sound legal
maneuvering or client representation. Those who complain that
the new rules change the traditional role of the advocate appar53
ently have forgotten their obligations as officers of the court."
pursuant to § 472(d) and report to back to Congress four years after the Reform Act went
into effect-by December 31, 1995.
47. 139 CONG. Rac. H8475 (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
48. 62 U.S.L.W. 1977 (Nov. 30, 1993).
49. Compare MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1 to 1.4, 1.6, 2.1, 3.1 to 3.4
(1992) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 to 7-39 and DR 7-101 to DR

7-110 (1980) (subtle differences with respect to zealous representation balanced with duties
of a lawyer to his or her client, the tribunal and third parties).
50. Cf 61 U.S.L.W. at 4372 (publication of proposed F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(B)).
51. Bell et al., supra note 22, at 46-48; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. For an even more radical proposal, see William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of
Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More Effective thanDiscovery?, 74JuDIcATURE 178, 181 (1991),
advocating that disclosure replace discovery with only court-ordered discovery allowed; but
see Thomas M. Mengler, EliminatingAbusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for
Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 160-65 (1992), which criticizes Schwarzer's proposal. See also Bell et
al., supra note 22 at 46-48 (illustrating how the proposed automatic disclosure requirement
opposes adversarial norms). See generally Richard P. Holme, ProposedAmendments to the Federal
Civil Rules: The Sirens of Revolution, 21 COLO. LAw. 923 (1992) (informative discussion of the
potential effects of proposed Rule 26 on current litigation techniques).
53. Thomas A. Zlaket, EncouragingLitigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1993). Justice Zlaket chaired the Arizona Committee to Study Civil Litigation Abuse, Cost, and Delay. As a result of the Committee's work, on July 1, 1992 amendments, proposed by the Committee, to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
on a state wide basis. Id. at 3. These amendments included changes to Arizona's discovery
rules, which are substantially similar to the federal amendments to Rule 26. See Astz. R. Civ.
P. 26.1 (Supp. 1993).
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Although automatic disclosure will make relevant information surrounding the dispute readily available to both parties, nothing in the amendments restricts an attorney's ability to argue and present the disclosed
information in the light most favorable to his client. Further, if the statistics compiled in Arizona indicate the actual effect the amendments to
Rule 26 will have at the federal level, fears that another layer of discovery
has been added, as well as additional delay, are unfounded.
Arizona, prior to adopting amendments to its Rules of Civil Procedure, conducted an experiment, beginning on January 2, 1991 and ending
on July 1, 1992, to determine the actual effect the amendments would
have. 54 The experiment consisted of two groups. The first group tried
cases using the then proposed rules, the second using the old.55 Based on
this study, Arizona found that, in all but the most complex of cases, parties
subject to the proposed rules took fewer depositions, and made fewer requests for answers to interrogatories, admissions of facts, and requests for
the production of documents. 5 6 Cases subject to the proposed rules completed discovery in a shorter period of time and filed one-third the
amount of discovery motions filed in cases not subject to the proposed
rules. 5 7 Further, judges using the proposed rules agreed fewer discovery
disputes occurred and noted many attorneys were on "top of the case"
earlier under the proposed rules. 58 Finally, the attorneys involved in the
experimental program, in general, viewed the program as a success; finding they needed less time to complete discovery, that the quality of information received during discovery did not decrease, and that significantly
fewer discovery abuses occurred under the proposed rules.59 Whether the
same results will be achieved under the new Federal Rules remains to be
seen. Regardless of the results, however, the amendments should increase
the use of ADR.
A.

Increase in the Use of ADR

With the amendments to Rule 26 now effective, mediation, summary
trials, arbitration, and a number of other ADR procedures may take on a
new lustre. Once the core facts are disclosed, and the parties to the dispute have a clear understanding of their adversary's case, the possibilities
for resolving liability and damages conflicts outside of the courtroom
multiply.
Under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are required to comply with Rule 2.1, which compels attorneys to advise their
clients about the availability of ADR.6° Today, mediation, settlement con54. Hon. Robert D. Myers, Mad Track: An Experiment in Terror,25 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 11, 13, 18
(1993). At the time this article was written, statistics were still being gathered. The results
documented infra should, therefore, be viewed cautiously.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20-21.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id. at 23-25.
60. Rule 2.1 provides:
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ferences, summary trials, arbitration, and other alternatives to litigation
are playing important roles in the resolution of conflict, with reduced cost
to litigants. 6 1
1. Why ADR Methods are Used
Automatic disclosure rules will increase the opportunities to employ
ADR. 62 Because automatic disclosure compels the exchange of all information relating to the claims or the defenses interposed in the pleadings,
disclosure will increase the incentive to settle because the strength, weakness, and value of every case will be known.
A number of methods have been developed to effect early and fair
settlement of disputed claims.6 3 The many forms of ADR provide broad
flexibility in arriving at the most advantageous procedure, and often result, for the parties. The dispute resolution technique may be easily tailored to fit a particular case. Lawyers weigh the merits of each ADR
technique and balance the advantage, disadvantage, and cost before making a recommendation to the client; however, every claim is not entitled to
the same treatment. Claims involving less than $10,000, and minor claims
for damages obviously are not entitled to the same procedural formalities
as multi-million dollar antitrust, contract, or tort actions involving substan64
tial questions as to both liability and damages.
All disputed claims have a value. The resolution of disputes depends
upon the use of known facts to evaluate the validity and merits of a claim.
Many litigants are slow to recognize the merits of an opponent's claim
until all the facts are known. When the immutable facts point to substantial liability and damages, a settlement is not hard to reach. If the facts fall
short of establishing liability and damages, the value of a claim to the complaining party is diminished to reflect a more realistic value. If there is no
liability, the cost of a lengthy trial can force the dismissal of the complaint.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation. In a matter involving or expected to
involve litigation, a lawyer should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute
resolution which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective sought.
COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (West 1993). The A.B.A. MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT does not have a comparable requirement.
61. See generallyJohn R. Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes Out of Court, HARv. Bus. REv.,

Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 166 (discussing five common ADR techniques); Mary-Alice Coleman, Implementation of California'sDispute Resolution Programs Act: A State-Local Government Partnership,16

L. REv. S75 (1989) (discussing the California Dispute Resolution Programs Act which
facilitates out-of-court community ADR programs throughout the state).
62. For a study of similar disclosure rules and their effects on ADR, see Edwin B. Wainscott & Douglas W. Holly, Z/aket Rules and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195
(1993).
PEPP.

63. See generally AMERICAN

COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAwYERS, HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVES FOR

DisPuTE RESOLUTION (July 24, 1991).

64. See Hazard, supra note 28, at 2244-45 (discussing the problematic nature of a single

set of civil procedure rules to handle a variety of dissimilar claims).
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A brief review of some of the most common forms of ADR demonstrate
how automatic disclosure may avoid extended litigation.
B.

Common Forms of ADR
1. Mediation

Mediation utilizes a neutral and impartial third party to facilitate communication and resolution of disputed issues. 65 A mediator can point out
weaknesses in the claims made by the parties without using discovery as a
tool. 66 The mediator analyzes problems of proof, liability, and damages so
that disputed factual and legal issues are fairly considered and discussed.
Voluntay disclosure is the key to successful mediation, and after the parties
agree on the facts, the mediator, or mediators, are able to assist the parties
in reaching a compromise and settlement. Settlement occurs when both
sides take off their rose-colored glasses and recognize the potential costs
and risks associated with a trial. Automatic disclosure should eliminate
the risk of information being hidden until trial and should obviate the
strengths and weaknesses of every case.
2.

Settlement Conferences

Settlement conferences are also widely used as an alternative to litigation and involve procedures that are similar to mediation. Usually, either
ajudge who will not preside at trial, or a neutral third party, will hear both
sides of the case, advise the parties on the law relating to their claim, and
assist in the negotiation of a settlement. 67 In mediation, a mediator facilitates dialogue between the parties, while in a settlement conference the
neutral third party actually evaluates the disputants' claims. 68 Settlement
conferences are most effective when opposing parties have strong feelings
about the facts of the case, but are willing to listen to a neutral third
party's view of the law that will be applied to the facts. 69 As noted above,
because automatic disclosure should facilitate the discovery of the relevant
facts, disputants will have a greater incentive to seek a neutral, third party
evaluation of their claims and defenses.
3. Summary Jury Trials
Summary trials provide another alternative to a full-blown jury trial.
While summary trials are now widely used, automatic disclosure will augment the use of this ADR technique. In a summary trial, a judge, or a
judge and a jury, hears counsel present the client's case, and both the
factual and legal basis for recovery. Opposing counsel then outlines the
factual and legal arguments that support a defense verdict for limited
ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE, COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, MAN.
65.
UAL ON ALTERNATIVE DisPum RESOLUTION 6 (1992) [hereinafter MANUAL ON ADR].

66. The mediation process involves voluntary disclosure by the parties, in a private and
confidential meeting. See id. at 6.
67. See id. at 7.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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damages. 70 The availability of all of the facts is essential to a summary
trial. If automatic disclosure is mandated, a summary trial may provide a
vehicle for either settlement or final determination of the issues. Sometimes the parties stipulate that a summary trial will not be binding. Such a
stipulation, however, does not limit the use of the procedure because the
losing party is compelled to recognize that the same result may be waiting
at the end of expensive and time-consuming litigation. Experience has
demonstrated that a non-binding summary trial may precipitate a
settlement.
4. Arbitration
Automatic disclosure may also bring about more arbitration as a feasible and more inexpensive means of resolving disputed claims. The arbitrator, or arbitrators, hear evidence and testimony and determine the
disputed issues in either a binding or non-binding decision. 71 Generally,
arbitration is regulated by statute or contract and includes limited discovery, 7 2 which will not be required with automatic disclosure. 73 The American Arbitration Association continues to refine the arbitration process and
to expand the alternatives available for dispute resolution.
C. Forums Developed to Promote ADR
As a result of the expanded use of arbitration, mediation, and other
ADR procedures, many new organizations have been formed to render
dispute resolution services. Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services Co.
('JAMS") of Orange County, California, provides private dispute resolution services in a number of states. Endispute of Washington, D.C., also
provides similar ADR services in several jurisdictions. In Colorado, the
Judicial Arbiter Group ("JAG") continues its enviable reputation for success in providing rent-a-judge services. Judicate, Inc., of Lake Success,
New York, also offers ADR services on a broad scale. Pursuant to the
above, an adequate infrastructure presently exists to facilitate the increased use of ADR techniques, should the need arise.
Many of the private dispute resolution or rent-a-judge services employ
retired or former judges, and attribute their success to the quality of the
judges that handle the resolution of disputes. These ADR services offer a
wide variety of alternatives to litigation, emphasizing that the private resolution of disputes occurs without delay and is therefore faster than litigation. Private dispute resolution is often less expensive than litigation,
taking place without the road blocks normally associated with a contested
trial and overburdened and crowded court dockets. Because ADR services
70. See id. at 10; see also W. Frank Newton & David G. Swenson, Adjudication by Privately
CompensatedJudges in Texas, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 813, 820-840 (1984) (discussing Texas statute
authorizing "Special Judge Trials").
71. See MANUAL ON ADR, ,supra note 65, at 12.
72. Id. Many securities dealers, for example, provide for arbitration contracts with their
clients.
73. See C.R.C.P. 26.1.
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servare generally better, faster, and cheaper, private dispute resolution
74
ices will most likely continue to expand in use and availability.
CONCLUSION

Mediation, summary trials, and arbitration all have unique advantages
and disadvantages depending on the posture of the case. Industries recognize the high costs and risks of litigation. It is therefore reasonable to
anticipate that these alternatives to litigation will grow more important,
and more frequently used in the future.75 The automatic disclosure requirements of Rule 26 may appear to have the potential for increasing
litigation costs. However, if the end result of automatic disclosure is to
reduce contested trial by fostering alternatives to litigation, the ultimate
goal of reducing the cost of litigation may be achieved.

74. SeeJudith M. Filner & Margaret Shaw, Update: Development of Dispute Resolution in State
Courts, FORUM , Summer/Fall 1993, at 36.
75. See Richard Phalon, PrivatizingJustice,FoRBEs, Dec. 7, 1992, at 126. See generally Steve
Kaufman, See You Out of Court, NATION'S Bus., June 1992, at 58 (overview of ADR techniques
and a sampling of existing ADR services).

1994]

IJMITED DISCOVERY
APPENDIX A

COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(C.R.S. Repl. vol. 7A, 1990 & Supp. 1993)
RULE 26.1.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS REGARDING LIMITED AND SIMPLIFIED

DISCOVERY

(a) REQUEST FOR LIMITED AND SIMPLIFIED DISCOVERY. A party may at
any time file a written request that discovery in the case be governed by
this Rule 26.1. Such request may be endorsed upon a pleading of the
party. Any party opposing such request shall in his responsive pleading, if
one is required, or within thirty (30) days after service of such request
upon such party if no further responsive pleading is required, file a written
response setting forth the reasons why the provisions of this Rule 26.1
should not apply. If no party opposes such request, the provisions of this
Rule 26.1 shall govern discovery in the case. If opposition to the request is
filed, the matter shall be determined by the court within thirty (30) days
after demand for such determination is made to the court by any party.
(b) ORDER FOR LIMITED AND SIMPLIFIED DISCOVERY. The court may at
any time, in the interest of justice, sua sponte enter a written order that
discovery in the case shall be governed by this Rule 26.1. Any party objecting to such order shall, within thirty (30) days after service of a copy
thereof upon such party, file a motion stating the reasons why the provisions of this Rule 26.1 should not apply. The matter shall be determined
by the court within thirty (30) days after the filing of such motion or, if
more than one party objects, within thirty (30) days after the filing of the
last such motion.
(c) DETERMINATION. The court shall determine whether in the interest ofjustice discovery should be limited and simplified in accordance with
this Rule 26.1. The factors to be considered by the trial court in determining whether to order limited and simplified discovery shall include, but
shall not be limited to, the following:
(1) Whether the factual and legal issues involved in the case
lend themselves to the limited and simplified discovery provided
for in this Rule 26.1.
(2) The extent and expense of discovery anticipated in the case.
(3) The amount in controversy.
(4) The number of parties and their alignment with respect to
the underlying claims and defenses.
(5) Whether any party would be prejudiced in the trial of the
case by application of or failure to apply this Rule 26.1.
(d) DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THIS RULE 26.1. When the provisions of this Rule 26.1 govern, the parties shall thereafter be limited to the
following methods of discovery, unless the order for limited and simplified
discovery is subsequently modified or rescinded by order of court for good
cause shown:
(1) A party may take the depositions of each opposing party and
two other persons. The manner of proceeding by way of deposi-
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tion and the use thereof shall otherwise be governed by Rules 26,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 45.
(2) A party may serve one set of written interrogatories upon
each adverse party. The scope and manner of proceeding by way
of interrogatories and the use thereof shall otherwise be governed by Rules 26 and 33, except that the number of interrogatories to any one party shall not exceed thirty (30), each of which
shall consist of a single question.
(3) When there is in controversy the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party or of a person in the
custody or under the legal control of a party, an adverse party
may obtain a mental or physical examination of that party or person upon reasonable written notice to such party or person.
Otherwise, the provisions of Rule 35 shall apply to such
examinations.
(4) Inspection and copying of documents or tangible things and
entry, inspection or testing of land or property shall be accomplished pursuant to Rule 34.
(5) A party may serve upon each adverse party one set of requests for admissions which shall not exceed twenty (20) in
number, each of which shall consist of a single request The
scope and manner of proceeding by way of requests for admissions and the use thereof shall otherwise be governed by Rule 36.
(6) All discovery governed by this Rule 26.1(c) shall be completed no later than thirty (30) days before trial.
(e) CONTINUING DUTY TO DISCLOSE. Every party is under a continuing duty to timely supplement or amend responses pursuant to Rule
26(e).
(f) PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURE; AUTHENTICITY;, AND BINDING EFFECT. Each
party shall comply with the provisions of C.R.C.P. 16.
(g) DEPOSITION OF UNAVAILABLE WITNESS. A party may take the testimony of any person by deposition upon stipulation, or upon court order if
the court determines that there is a reasonable likelihood that the person
will be unavailable at trial as a witness and that the testimony of such person is necessary to a claim or defense of any party. Such order may be
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be deposed and to all parties.
(h) SANCTIONS. If any party fails to comply with the provisions of this
Rule 26.1 in an action governed by it, the court may impose sanctions
upon such party pursuant to Rule 37.
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APPENDIX B

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY, DuTY OF
DISCLOSURE
(a)

REQUIRED

DISCLOSURES;

METHODS

TO

DISCOVER

ADDITIONAL

MATTER.
(1) INrIAL DISCLOSURES.

Except to the extent otherwise

stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, without
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the
party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents
or other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is
based, including materials bearing on the nature and
extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34
any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part
or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action
or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall
be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available to it and is not excused from making its
disclosures because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case
or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or
because another party has not made its disclosures.
(2)

DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.

(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party shall disclose to other parties the
identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by
the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness
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who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of
the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed
by the witness. The report shall contain a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis
and reasons therefor; the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any
exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the
opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a
list of all publications authored by the witness within the
preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for
the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases
in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times
and in the sequence directed by the court. In the absence of other directions from the court or stipulation
by the parties, the disclosures shall be made at least 90
days before the trial date or the date the case is to be
ready for trial or, if the evidence is intended solely to
contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter
identified by another party under paragraph (2) (B),
within 30 days after the disclosure made by the other
party. The parties shall supplement these disclosures
when required under subdivision (e) (1).

(3) PRETRIAuL DISCLOSURES. In addition to the disclosures required in the preceding paragraphs, a party shall provide to
other parties the following information regarding the evidence
that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment
purposes:
(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the
address and telephone number of each witness, separately identifying those whom the party expects to present and those whom the party may call if the need
arises;
(B) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of
the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and
(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party
expects to offer and those which the party may offer if
the need arises.
Unless otherwise directed by the court, these disclosures
shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may
serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under
Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the
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grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown.
(4) FORM OF DISCLOSURES; FILING.

Unless otherwise di-

rected by order or local rule, all disclosures under paragraphs
(1) through (3) shall be made in writing, signed, served, and
promptly filed with the court.
(5)

METHODS TO

DISCOVER ADDITIONAL

MATTER.

Parties

may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods:
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property under Rule 34 or
45(a)(1)(C), for inspection and other purposes; physical and
mental' examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. Unless otherwise limited by order
of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows:
(1) IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,

custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information
sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
(2) LIMITATIONS. By order or by local rule, the court may
alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions and
interrogatories and may also limit the length of depositions
under Rule 30 and the number of requests under Rule 36. The
frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited
by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. The court
may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
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TRIAL PREPARATION: EXPERTS.

(A) A party may depose any person who has been
identified

as

an

expert

whose

opinions

may be

presented at trial. If a report from the expert is required under subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition
shall not be conducted until after the report is
provided.
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by
deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the
court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay
the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under this subdivision; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4) (B)
of this rule the court shall require the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees
and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in
obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(5)

CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE OR PROTECTION OF TRIAL PREPARA-

When a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or
subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall
make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
TION MATERIALS.

(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the

movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district
where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the
following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the
time or place;
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(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by
order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents
or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,
the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order
that any party or other person provide or permit discovery. The
provisions of Rule 37(a) (4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DIscoVERY. Except when authorized
under these rules or by local rule, order, or agreement of the parties, a
party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met
and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of
justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) SUPPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURES AND RESPONSES. A party who
has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or responded to a request for
discovery with a disclosure or response is under a duty to supplement or
correct the disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances:
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate
intervals its disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns
that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during
the discovery process or in writing. With respect to testimony of
an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision
(a) (2) (B) the duty extends both to information contained in the
report and to information provided through a deposition of the
expert, and any additions or other changes to this information
shall be disclosed by the time the party's disclosures under Rule
26(a) (3) are due.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for
admission if the party learns that the response is in some material
respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or correc-
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tive information has not otherwise been made known to the
other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) MEETING OF PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOvERY. Except in actions
exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as
soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling
conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), meet to
discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, to make or arrange
for the disclosures required by subdivision (a) (1), and to develop a proposed discovery plan. The plan shall indicate the parties' views and proposals concerning:

(1) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or
requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a) or local rule,
including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision
(a) (1) were made or will be made;
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when
discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular
issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other
limitations should be imposed; and
(4) any other orders that should be entered by the court
under subdivision (c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging and being present
or represented at the meeting, for attempting in good faith to agree on
the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 10
days after the meeting a written report outlining the plan.
(g)

SIGNING OF DIscLosuREs, DIScOvERY REQUESTS,

RESPONSES, AND

OBJECTIONS.

(1) Every disclosure made pursuant to subdivision (a) (1) or
subdivision (a) (3) shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be
stated. An unrepresented party shall sign the disclosure and state
the party's address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, the
disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made.
(2) Every discovery request, response, or objection made by
a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. An unrepresented party shall sign the request, response, or objection and state the party's address. The
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after a reasonable inquiry, the request, response, or objection is:
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(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law;
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or
expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to
the attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with
respect to it until it is signed.
(3) If without substantial justification a certification is made
in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the disclosure, request, response,
or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.

